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Abstract and Keywords
This chapter examines how the general framework for indispensability 
arguments developed by Enoch in the metaethical context plays out in its 
ancestral home, the philosophy of mathematics. Enoch’s framework is inspired 
by the Quine–Putnam type of indispensability argument in mathematics and is 
liable to inherit the latter’s holism. But once this holism is expunged from 
Enoch’s framework it turns out that Enoch’s indispensability argument is 
stronger in the moral than in the mathematical case, since it is more plausible 
that normative entities are indispensible to all projects of practical deliberation 
than it is that mathematical entities are indispensible to all projects of scientific 
theorizing. The upshot is that, given Enoch’s framework, the move away from 
holism undermines indispensability arguments in mathematics but not in ethics
Keywords:   deliberation, Enoch, indispensability, holism, mathematical objects, normative properties
12.1 Indispensability Theses
Indispensability arguments are widespread both inside and outside philosophy. 
Imagine that I make a New Year’s resolution to learn how to cook French 
cuisine. Hearing of this project, you warn me that
(1) Shallots are indispensable for fine French cooking
and that this is a problem because the local grocery stores do not stock shallots. 
Presuming that this indispensability claim is true, what are my options for 
pressing ahead with my cooking project in the absence of shallots? The first 
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option is for me to simply lower my standards: fine French cooking may require 
shallots, but I will just set my sights on adequate French cooking, which should 
still be possible, perhaps by just substituting onions where shallots are called 
for. A second option is to stick with the fine cooking project, but to switch 
cuisines. Perhaps I will learn instead how to cook fine Thai food, which is shallot- 
free, and make use of the well-stocked Asian grocery store in my neighborhood. 
A third option is to keep my focus on fine French cuisine, but abandon my 
aspirations to cook it. Instead I will read about its history, browse classic 
cookbooks, and go out to upmarket French restaurants to sample canonical 
dishes.
All three of these options would permit me to retain important aspects of my 
original project, while not purchasing a single shallot. And I can do this without 
challenging the ‘shallot indispensability thesis’ enshrined in (1). But what if I 
want to stick to the letter of my original intention, namely to cook fine French 
food? Do the following three propositions form a consistent set?
 (p.221) (1) Shallots are indispensable for fine French cooking.
(2) I carry out the project of learning to cook fine French food.
(3) I do not use any shallots.
I think that this set is indeed consistent, and that—despite the frivolity of this 
particular example—that there is a more general point here that has important 
implications for indispensability arguments in different areas of philosophy.
The two areas that I shall focus on here are philosophy of mathematics and 
metaethics. In recent years, several philosophers have sought to draw parallels 
between the use of indispensability arguments in these two areas. Although I 
think that there are useful insights to be gained through such a comparative 
study, my main goal in this chapter is to sound a note of caution. Differences 
between the contexts of applied mathematics and of metaethics mean that when 
we formulate sets of propositions corresponding to (1), (2), and (3) for each of 
these domains, the set is consistent in the mathematical case but not in the 
ethical case. This gives the opponents of indispensability an avenue of escape in 
the former that is not available in the latter, which in turn affects how the 
corresponding indispensability argument needs to be formulated. To put the 
point in terms that are not yet very helpful: applied mathematics is more like 
French cooking than metaethics!
An influential argument for mathematical Platonism is based on the following 
indispensability thesis:
(4) Mathematics is indispensable for science.
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Put very briefly, the Quine–Putnam indispensability argument (QPIA) ties our 
ontological commitments to those of our best available scientific theories. We 
ought rationally to believe in theoretical posits such as electrons and black holes 
because they are indispensable to current science. Abstract mathematical 
objects such as numbers, functions, and sets are also indispensable to current 
science. Hence we ought to believe in the existence of abstract mathematical 
objects, and we ought to embrace mathematical Platonism.
(1) and (4) are similar in form: in both cases, indispensability is a two-place 
relation, ‘X is indispensable for Y’. But there are apparent differences in what 
kind of relatum fills these X and Y slots in the respective relations. In our 
cookery example, what is claimed to be indispensable is a kind of object (i.e. 
shallots). In the Platonism example, what is claimed to be indispensable is a 
subject matter (i.e. mathematics). Actually, I think (1) and (4) can be 
paraphrased, without loss of meaning, so as to bring their respective X-relata 
more into line. The difference is that, in discussions of French cooking, no side 
in the debate doubts the  (p.222) existence of shallots. Hence, involving shallots 
directly as a relatum in the indispensability claim in (1) does not beg any 
questions. By contrast, the relevant debate within the philosophy of mathematics 
is precisely about whether abstract mathematical objects exist. So anti- 
Platonists will not (initially) accept any claim about the indispensability of 
mathematical objects per se. (4) is standardly read as elliptical for
(4’) Quantification over mathematical objects is indispensable for science.
Thus, what is asserted to be indispensable for science is the activity of 
quantifying over mathematical objects, rather than the mathematical objects 
themselves. Correspondingly, (1) could also be paraphrased to put an activity as 
the X-relatum:
(1’) Using shallots is indispensable for fine French cooking.
So much for the first half of the indispensability relation.1 What about the 
second half? In his recent book Taking Morality Seriously, David Enoch draws 
inspiration from QPIA to formulate an indispensability argument for what he 
calls ‘robust metanormative realism’. Central to Enoch’s discussion is the 
distinction he draws between ‘instrumental indispensability’ and ‘intrinsic 
indispensability’. Instrumental indispensability corresponds to the two-place 
relation we have been discussing above. As Enoch puts it, ‘indispensability is 
always indispensability for or to a certain purpose or project’ (2011 p. 67, italics 
in original).
What makes Enoch’s approach so interesting is the generality of the framework 
that he constructs for analyzing indispensability arguments across a range of 
different contexts. My plan is to look at some key features of Enoch’s framework 
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and see what insights might be applied back to more specific indispensability 
arguments, both in mathematics and in metaethics.
12.2 Projects
Despite the importance to Enoch’s analysis of the notion of a project, nowhere 
does he give an explicit definition of what he means by this term. He does, 
however, give several examples of candidate projects. His two core examples are 
the scientific project and the deliberative project. Enoch does not say much 
about the scientific project, other than that he sees it as filling the Y-relatum in 
the indispensability thesis of QPIA. He goes into considerably more detail about 
the  (p.223) deliberative project, since this lies at the core of his own version of 
the indispensability argument. Deliberation, for Enoch, is ‘the process of trying 
to make the decision it makes the most sense for one to make’ (2011 p. 73). In 
deliberating, ‘you commit to there being (normative) reasons relevant to your 
deliberation’ (p. 74). The deliberative project, then, is the general practice of 
‘asking ourselves what to do, what to believe, how to reason, what to care 
about’ (p. 70). In addition to these two examples, Enoch also mentions in passing 
the following projects: ‘the reasoning project’ (p. 64); ‘the project of finding out 
about [the external world]’ (p. 64); ‘the project of sorcery’ (p. 69); ‘the project of 
achieving eternal bliss’ (p. 69).
These examples of projects are strikingly diverse, but one feature they have in 
common is their extreme generality. As we shall see, this generality plays an 
important role in the next stage of Enoch’s argument. As Enoch points out, 
instrumental indispensability per se cannot be enough to ground ontological 
commitment: some restriction is needed on what counts as an ‘acceptable’ 
project. What places the scientific project on the right side of this divide, and the 
project of sorcery on the wrong side? Enoch has an interesting answer to this 
question. He introduces a second notion, intrinsic indispensability, and defines a 
project to be intrinsically indispensable if it is ‘rationally non-optional’. This 
results in the following proposed criterion of ontological commitment:
(IP) We ought rationally to be ontologically committed to F’s if F’s are 
instrumentally indispensable for an intrinsically indispensable project.
Thus, we ought to believe in the existence of electrons, and numbers, because 
they are instrumentally indispensable to the intrinsically indispensable scientific 
project. And, according to Enoch, we ought to believe in irreducibly normative 
truths because they are instrumentally indispensable to the intrinsically 
indispensable deliberative project. As Enoch puts it, ‘the respectability of the 
project confers respectability on [the] commitment’ (2011 p. 69). Among the 
projects that Enoch mentions, all very general in their scope and scale, some are 
rationally non-optional and others are not. The project of sorcery, for example, is 
presumably one that we can (and probably should) opt out of. Hence it does not 
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matter to our ontological commitments what is (instrumentally) indispensable 
for sorcery.
(IP) has an appealing symmetry, in its combining two notions of indispensability 
into a single criterion of ontological commitment. And the idea of using rational 
non-optionality as the marker of ontologically serious projects is an interesting 
one. So let us assume, for sake of argument, that (IP) is correct as a criterion for 
ontological commitment. In making this assumption, I am  (p.224) deliberately 
bypassing at least two significant debates within the indispensability literature. 
Firstly, many anti-realists take issue with instrumental indispensability being 
sufficient, even in the context of an intrinsically indispensable project. So-called 
‘weasel nominalists’ in the philosophy of mathematics take this line against 
QPIA, arguing that there is nothing irrational about making certain claims in the 
course of pursuing a project and then taking back these claims at the end. 
Secondly, some anti-realists have questioned the legitimacy of linking intrinsic 
indispensability to truth. Just because I cannot rationally avoid engaging in a 
project, why think that the results of the project are likely to be true? There is 
plenty more to be said on both sides of these two debates, but they will not be 
my concern here.
The question I want to address in the remainder of the chapter is whether 
Enoch’s framework can be applied to more recent indispensability-centered 
debates in the philosophy of mathematics, and in particular whether his notion 
of a ‘non-optional project’ can get traction in these debates. One irony of 
Enoch’s drawing on indispensability debates in the philosophy of mathematics to 
motivate his favored version of metanormative realism is that in many respects 
these debates have moved on in ways that have a significant impact on Enoch’s 
analytical framework. One major change, as we shall see, is that the focus has 
shifted—in these philosophy of mathematics debates—to projects that look very 
different from the large-scale projects that Enoch presents.
12.3 Abandoning Holism about Projects
What does it mean for a particular activity to be indispensable ‘for science’? As 
Enoch points out, little attention was paid to this question in the early debates 
over QPIA, mainly because this argument is firmly rooted in Quine’s holism. On 
this picture, science is a web of interconnected theories evaluated as a single 
whole by balancing such criteria as empirical adequacy and simplicity. If the best 
such web contains mathematical posits, then mathematics is indispensable for 
science. It matters not where in the web such posits appear, nor what precise 
theoretical role they play.
Over the past decade or so, however, defenders of Platonism have sought to 
separate the indispensability argument from Quinean holism. Once holism is 
abandoned, specification of the Y-relatum of the indispensability thesis becomes 
crucial—vague reference to indispensability ‘for science’ is no longer enough, 
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since it may not necessarily be the case that all parts and aspects of the 
scientific project are ontologically on a par. There are at least two basic axes 
along which such specification might take place. Firstly, we might subdivide the 
scientific  (p.225) project into different kinds of activity (or theoretical role), 
such as description, prediction, explanation, or theory formulation. Secondly, we 
might subdivide by subject area, for example chemistry, physics, evolutionary 
biology, or quantum mechanics.2
Holism-free versions of QPIA have tended to focus on specification of theoretical 
role. The most popular of these ‘second-generation’ indispensability arguments 
focuses on explanatory role. The motivating idea is that the target audience for 
QPIA is scientific realists, and that the core generator of ontological 
commitment within scientific realism is inference to the best explanation. We 
believe in the existence of electrons not merely because we cannot avoid 
quantifying over them, but because the existence of electrons best explains 
various observations that we make. What matters, therefore, is whether 
mathematical objects play an indispensable explanatory role in science. Thus the 
sharpened indispensability thesis is:
(5) Mathematics plays an indispensable explanatory role in science.
The resulting argument is known variously as the Explanatory Indispensability 
Argument or the Enhanced Indispensability Argument (EIA).
This move towards focusing more explicitly on explanation, as embodied in EIA, 
may not seem much different in spirit from Enoch’s own explication of QPIA. 
According to Enoch’s analysis, although QPIA is focused on the scientific project 
as a whole, the principal evaluative criterion used when comparing competing 
theories is explanatory. F’s are indispensable for the scientific project if the most 
explanatory overall theory includes F’s. However, this common focus on 
explanation masks an important difference between EIA and Enoch’s conception 
of QPIA. This is because Enoch retains the fundamental holism that is present in 
the Quinean framework; competing formulations of a single overarching 
scientific theory are still compared as wholes. All that has changed is that the 
theoretical virtue of explanatoriness has been promoted to the top spot when 
comparing these theories.
EIA is sharply different in this respect, since—as has already been mentioned—it 
is predicated on a rejection of Quinean holism. No longer are scientific theories 
(or webs of scientific theories) compared in their entirety. Instead, the focus is 
on individual explanations in science. The point is that what matters is the 
explanatory role of the posits, not the overall explanatoriness  (p.226) of the 
theory in which they happen to be embedded. The proponent of EIA concedes 
the point—pressed by Maddy, Melia, and others—that mere appearance in an 
explanatory theory is not enough to ground ontological commitment to a given 
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posit. Our best overall theory of fluid mechanics may make reference to such 
things as continuous fluids and infinitely deep reservoirs, but that ought not to 
commit us to the existence of idealized entities of this sort.
Couched in Enoch’s terminology, what has happened in the evolution from QPIA 
to EIA is a shift from viewing the instrumental indispensability of mathematics 
as pertaining to the scientific project as a whole, or even just to the explanatory 
subproject within science, and instead viewing this instrumental indispensability 
as pertaining to a collection of ‘mini-projects’ that concern the explanation of 
specific scientific phenomena. This shift is crucial because of the following fact 
about scientific explanation: many (perhaps most) scientific explanations do not 
make explanatory use of mathematics. For many of these mini-projects, 
therefore, mathematics is not instrumentally indispensable. For those 
explanatory mini-projects that do make indispensable use of mathematics, we 
need to revisit the question of whether they are indeed rationally non-optional in 
Enoch’s sense.
12.4 Explanatory Mini-Projects—Optional and Non-Optional
For present purposes, I shall take an explanatory mini-project to be an 
investigation that seeks to answer a request to explain some specific scientific 
phenomenon or pattern of phenomena. Such investigations may have both 
theoretical and experimental components, and may vary considerably in their 
scope and sophistication. To give us something to focus on, let us consider two 
such potential mini-projects:
(6) Why do periodical cicadas have prime periods?
(7) Why does C. Elegans have a prime number of cells?
Mini-project (6) is quite well-known, and has been much discussed in the recent 
literature on EIA.3 Mini-project (7) has never (to my knowledge) been either 
articulated or pursued.
So how does the issue of rational non-optionality play out in the context of EIA? 
It is tempting to think that the rational non-optionality of the scientific  (p.227) 
project is enough to ground EIA also, since all the explanatory mini-projects are 
components of the scientific project. But this is not enough. For we might be 
able to engage in the (non-optional) scientific project to a sufficient degree 
without engaging in those explanatory mini-projects that indispensably involve 
mathematics. Returning to my initial French cooking scenario, we can now see 
more clearly how the three core claims, listed below, could be jointly consistent:
(1) Shallots are indispensable for fine French cooking.
(2) I carry out the project of learning to cook fine French food.
(3) I do not use any shallots.
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Shallots are indispensable for fine French cooking, but many individual French 
dishes do not call for shallots. So it is in fact possible to pursue the project of 
learning to cook fine French food, at least to a considerable degree, without 
acquiring any shallots. I can do this by picking those mini-projects, within the 
overall project of French cuisine, that do not involve shallots.
In this respect, there is a crucial disanalogy between the scientific project and 
the deliberative project. Amongst the mini-projects that make up the scientific 
project, some involve mathematics and some do not. By contrast, all—or nearly 
all—of the mini-projects that make up the deliberative project involve reference 
to metanormative truths. This is because, for Enoch, a deliberative mini-project 
is precisely the search for, and evaluation of, normative reasons that are relevant 
to the given decision. (If no reasons are forthcoming one way or the other, Enoch 
refers to the process not as ‘deliberation’ but as ‘arbitrary picking’ (2011 p. 73).) 
In other words, reasons are built into every specific case of deliberation, 
whereas mathematics is not built into every specific case of scientific 
explanation. As a result, it is plausible—in the metanormative context—to give a 
strong reading to the claim of instrumental indispensability: all (or nearly all) 
mini-projects within the deliberative project make essential reference to 
metanormative truths. Hence we cannot pursue the deliberative project at all 
without engaging with such truths. And this is the case regardless of whether 
any given mini-project is intrinsically indispensable.
As I have argued, the situation with respect to scientific explanation (and French 
cooking!) is sharply different. Since within science there are many explanatory 
mini-projects that avoid commitment to mathematical objects, the issue of the 
intrinsic indispensability of these mini-projects now comes to the fore. Put 
simply, unless at least some of those explanatory mini-projects that involve 
mathematics are themselves intrinsically indispensable, the road to ontological 
commitment to mathematical objects is blocked. (Analogously, what is required 
to force a commitment to acquire shallots is not just the  (p.228) demonstration 
that some French recipes need shallots, but that those dishes are themselves an 
unavoidably central part of French cuisine.)
Why is this a problem for the defender of EIA who wants to use Enoch’s 
framework? The problem is that specific mini-projects do seem to be rationally 
optional, and hence not intrinsically indispensable.4 Firstly, it seems 
psychologically possible to resist pursuing a specific explanatory project, even if 
we cannot stop ourselves across the board from seeking explanations of worldly 
phenomena. If someone poses the question of why cicadas have prime periods, 
there seems nothing to stop us from simply refusing to take up this challenge.5 
Secondly, this point seems to generalize across mini-projects regardless of 
context. As Enoch himself notes, ‘We can, of course, stop deliberating about one 
thing or another…It’s opting out of the deliberative project as a whole that may 
not be an option for us.’ (2011 pp. 70–1).6 If, as seems to be the case, rational 
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non-optionality of this psychological sort does not work to underpin a notion of 
intrinsic indispensability once we move from projects to mini-projects, is there 
some other sense of non-optionality that can do this job? One idea is to draw on 
methodological considerations from the scientific project itself. In other words, 
might there be rational grounds, given the general pursuit of the scientific 
project, that compel engagement with certain mini-projects?
Let us schematize the notion of explanatory mini-project that was introduced at 
the beginning of Section 12.4, and view it as stemming from a request to explain 
why some type of physical phenomenon, P, has property, Q. Rather than asking 
when we ought rationally to pursue a mini-project of this sort, it makes more 
sense to ask instead about criteria for when it is rationally acceptable not to 
pursue it. Below is a list of some putative such criteria:
(a) Truth: There are scientific grounds for doubting the truth of the 
explanandum, i.e. that P does in fact have property Q.7
(b) Relevance: P and/or Q are not part of the subject matter of science.8
 (p.229) (c) Significance: The fact that P has property Q is not 
scientifically significant.9
(d) Feasibility: The mini-project to explain why P has property Q has little 
chance of success.10
Note that (c) and (d) have more to do with practical rationality than theoretical 
rationality. In other words, if the explanandum is both scientific in its subject 
matter and such that we are justified, on scientific grounds, in believing it, then 
the only grounds for not engaging in the mini-project are pragmatic.
12.5 Picking Out Physical Patterns
Things get more complicated, however, if we shift our attention to one particular 
form of explanandum that is exhibited by many putative mathematical 
explanations in science. Both of the explanatory mini-projects listed in Section 
12.4 have the following form:
(MP) Why does physical phenomenon, P, have mathematical property, M?
For example, mini-project (7) asks why C. Elegans has a prime number of cells. A 
natural way of paraphrasing this claim is that the cells of C. Elegans can be 
mapped one–one onto a set whose cardinality is a prime number. However, here 
the explanandum is itself specified using objects from the contested (i.e. 
mathematical) domain. This appears to open the way to a third way of avoiding 
engagement with a given mini-project, on theoretical rational grounds, namely 
that the explanandum is only true if the existence of objects from the contested 
domain is already assumed. The point is that it looks question-begging to try to 
give an argument for the existence of F’s based on the indispensability of F’s for 
a mini-project which is itself premised on the existence of F’s!
Non-Optional Projects
Page 10 of 16
PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (oxford.universitypressscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 
2020. All Rights Reserved. An individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use.  
Subscriber: Swarthmore College; date: 12 August 2020
The problem, for the defender of mathematical Platonism, is that many—perhaps 
most—putative examples of mathematical explanation in science pertain to 
explananda that have the form given by (MP) above. Is there a way to argue, 
non-question-beggingly, for the rational non-optionality of such mini-projects? 
My view is that the Platonist does have an answer to the above challenge. I shall 
begin by sketching the general contours of the Platonist strategy and then show 
how it plays out in some specific cases.
 (p.230) The first step is the use of a mathematical property, M, to pick out a 
feature of some token physical phenomenon, P, or to pick out a pattern that 
holds across a range of physical phenomena of a given type. The key point is that 
this purely descriptive use of M is not taken to be ontologically committing by 
either side in the EIA debate, even if it is indispensable. Therefore, it does not 
beg the question against the anti-Platonist side to take this claim, that P has 
property M, as a provisional explanandum. We only get ontological commitment 
if the pattern picked out by M has explanatory power, and this depends on what 
the best explanation of (MP) turns out to be. I will not try here to give a precise 
characterization of explanatory power, but I take it to be closely linked to the 
capacity to generalize across a range of different situations. If the property or 
pattern picked out by M can in turn explain various more specific properties and 
patterns, then this boosts its explanatory credentials. Conversely, if nothing of 
much significance follows from possessing M then the mathematical property is 
not explanatory.
I shall formalize the above line of reasoning by introducing the notion of a 
mathematical property being ‘salient’:
Definition: M is salient with respect to P if there is no other mathematical 
property, M*, such that M* is part of the best explanation of why M applies 
to P, but M is not part of the best explanation of why M* applies to P.
The meta-property of salience is intended to pick out those mathematical 
properties that are explanatorily significant. It also provides a criterion of 
intrinsic indispensability: an explanatory mini-project of the form (MP) is 
intrinsically indispensable if and only if M is salient with respect to P.
To see how this plays out in an actual example, let us return to mini-project (6), 
which aims to explain why periodical cicadas have prime periods. As discussed 
in a previous paper, the best explanation of this fact is the following (cf. Baker 
2005 p. 233):
(6a) Having a life-cycle period which minimizes intersection with other 
(nearby/lower) periods is evolutionarily advantageous. [Biological ‘law’]
(6b) Prime periods minimize intersection (compared to non-prime periods). 
[Number theoretic theorem]
Non-Optional Projects
Page 11 of 16
PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (oxford.universitypressscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 
2020. All Rights Reserved. An individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use.  
Subscriber: Swarthmore College; date: 12 August 2020
(6c) Hence organisms with periodic life-cycles are likely to evolve periods 
that are prime.
My claim is that primeness here is a salient mathematical property. On the one 
hand, there seems to be no other mathematical property whose holding explains 
 (p.231) why primeness holds. On the other hand, the above explanation can be 
extended to explain why other more specific mathematical properties hold. For 
example, we can use it—together with some specific ecological facts—to explain 
why a given cicada subspecies has a seventeen-year period:
(6d) Cicadas in ecosystem-type, E, are limited by biological constraints to 
periods from fourteen to eighteen years.
(6e) Hence cicadas in ecosystem-type, E, are likely to evolve seventeen- 
year periods.
A significant feature of this specific explanandum, (6e), is that its mathematical 
component is dispensable. Reference to the period having a length of seventeen 
years can be paraphrased, in familiar fashion, into the language of first-order 
logic with identity. Thus the explanatory credentials of the salient mathematical 
property of primeness include the capacity to explain non-mathematical 
explananda.
It is important to note that salience is not an intrinsic feature of a given 
mathematical property. Just because primeness is salient in the context of mini- 
project (6) does not mean that it is salient in other contexts to which it applies. 
Consider, for example, mini-project (7), which is to explain why the nematode 
worm, C. Elegans, has a prime number of cells.11 Experimental evidence tells us 
that C. Elegans has 1031 cells, and nothing in current biological theory gives us 
reason to think that there is any particular significance to the fact that this 
number is prime. Perhaps there is some explanation for why C. Elegans has 1031 
cells, based on its evolutionary and developmental history. In this case, the best 
explanation for the explanandum of mini-project (7) has the following form:
(7a) […Evolutionary/developmental explanation…]
(7b) Hence, C. Elegans has 1031 cells.
(7c) 1031 is a prime number.
(7d) Hence, C. Elegans has a prime number of cells.
My claim, therefore, is that—in the context of mini-project (7)—primeness is not 
a salient property. It is explanatorily superfluous.
Non-Optional Projects
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Another way of looking at the contrast between (6) and (7) is in terms of the 
direction of explanation. The explanation given in (6) shows us that the cicada 
subspecies has period seveneteen (in part) because its period is prime. 
Conversely, the explanation in (7) shows us that C. Elegans has a prime number 
of cells because it has 1031 cells. In (6), there is a ‘top-down’ explanation using 
(p.232) primeness; in (7) there is a ‘bottom-up’ explanation of primeness. 
Hence primeness is salient in the former context but not in the latter.
Another aspect of explanatory power that is not an explicit byproduct of salience 
is the capacity for a given pattern of explanation to apply to other, distinct 
contexts. The pattern of explanation in the cicada mini-project is quite general, 
but does this mathematical framework actual apply to other cases? One obvious 
place to look is for other kinds of periodical organism, however it is unclear from 
the biological literature whether there are any cases of organisms with fixed, 
multi-year lifecycles other than periodical cicadas. In the absence of a clear case 
from evolutionary biology, I offer here a mini-project from a quite different 
subdomain of the scientific project. Despite its very different setting, it shares 
the mathematical framework of the cicada mini-project and with it the salient 
property of primeness.
(8) Why do the rear cogs of brakeless, fixed-gear bicycles typically have a 
prime number of teeth?
Before presenting a candidate explanation for this fact, a couple of clarifying 
remarks are in order. A fixed-gear bicycle has neither a gear-changing 
mechanism nor a ‘freewheel’ on the rear axle, so the pedals keep rotating 
whenever the back wheel is rotating. While not especially practical, such 
bicycles are quite popular, especially with riders who want to perform tricks of 
various kinds. Because stopping the pedals stops the back wheel, there is 
technically no need for a separate hand-operated brake mechanism. When the 
rider stops pedaling, the back wheel stops turning and the bicycle skids to a 
halt. This produces wear on the back tire, and if the same part of the tire is 
repeatedly used in such skids then this produces what is known as a skid patch.
Here then is the explanation of (8):
(8a) Tires last longer if they have fewer skid patches.
(8b) The number of skid patches is maximized if the number of teeth on 
front and rear cogs are coprime.
(8c) Prime numbers are coprime with the fewest other numbers.
(8d) Cyclists prefer to maximize the life of their tires.
(8e) Hence, rear cogs are typically chosen to have a prime number of teeth.
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The parallel with the cicada explanation is clear. In particular, the key 
mathematical component relates primeness to minimizing the frequency of 
intersection between two periodical phenomena (in this case the rotation of the 
front and rear cogs). The property of primeness is again salient, and it can be 
used to explain more specific facts about fixed-gear bicycles. For example, why 
does the rear cog  (p.233) of this particular brakeless, fixed-gear bicycle have 
seventeen teeth? A candidate explanation might run as follows:
(8f) Front cogs with between forty and fifty teeth and a gear ratio between 
2.3 and three are preferred by most cyclists.
(8g) Hence, the rear cog should have between fourteen and eighteen teeth.
(8h) Hence, this rear cog has seventeen teeth.
Here (8f) is an empirical fact about cyclists’ preferences, and (8g) follows from 
(8f) using basic arithmetic.
To summarize, when a mathematical property is salient in a given mini-project 
then it will tend to exhibit explanatory power in both ‘vertical’ and ‘horizontal’ 
directions. In the vertical direction, it will explain other, more specific properties 
that hold in the context of the given mini-project. In the horizontal direction, it 
will tend to feature in parallel patterns of argument that apply to quite different 
mini-projects.
12.6 Avoiding Ontological Inflation
I have argued that it is important for the defender of the Explanatory 
Indispensability Argument in the philosophy of mathematics to have some 
account of what makes an explanatory mini-project intrinsically indispensable. 
Otherwise the anti-Platonist opponent can accept the instrumental 
indispensability of mathematics to the overall project of science, and just avoid 
those mini-projects in which mathematics is playing a specifically explanatory 
role. I have also argued that salience is the key marker for when an explanatory 
mini-project that involves a mathematical property is intrinsically indispensable. 
But there is also a second reason why it is important to distinguish the 
indispensable mini-projects from the dispensable ones, and this is to avoid over- 
generating mathematical ontological commitments.
We have actually already witnessed an example of such mathematical inflation, 
in mini-project (7). The best explanation of why C. Elegans has a prime number 
of cells makes reference to the (ineliminable) property of primeness. But the 
salient property here is having 1031 cells, and this can be eliminated using the 
language of first-order logic with identity. So including the non-salient property 
here would increase our mathematical commitments. In this instance it does not 
seem especially serious, of course, because primeness comes in as a salient 
property in other mini-projects, such as the cicada mini-project, (6), and the 
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skid-patch mini-project, (8). So our global mathematical commitments are not 
inflated. However this may not always be the case. For a more dramatic case of 
(p.234) potential mathematical inflation, consider the following explanatory 
mini-project:
(9) Why do North American cicada species have periods that correspond to 
the numerators of coefficients in the series expansion of sinhx/sinx?
Here, sinhx is the hyperbolic sine function, which can be thought of as the 
imaginary part of the ordinary trigonometric sine function when this is extended 
into the complex plane. A series expansion is a method for calculating a function 
that cannot be expressed just by elementary operators (addition, subtraction, 
multiplication, and division). The resulting series has an infinite number of 
terms, and the more terms that are included in a given calculation the more 
accurate the approximation to the original function. Further mathematical 
details are not relevant here, except to note that the numerators for the 
coefficients of the first three terms of the series for sinhx/sinx are 1, 13, and 
17.12
The scenario here is similar to the C. Elegans mini-project, (7). As in that case, 
the link between the mathematical property and the physical phenomenon is 
(presumably) completely coincidental. If so, then the best explanation of (9) has 
the following form:
(9a) Cicadas species are either annual or they are periodical.
(9b) North American periodical cicadas have periods 13 and 17.  
[Explanation imported from mini-project (6).]
(9f) Hence, North American cicadas have periods 1, 13, and 17.
(9g) The initial numerators for the series expansion for sinhx/sinx are 1, 13, 
and 17.
(9h) Hence, cicada species have periods that correspond to the numerators 
of coefficients in the series expansion of sinhx/sinx.
The mathematical property of being a numerator of the given series expansion is 
not salient in (9). Why not? Because there is another mathematical property, 
having period 1, 13, or 17, which explains the holding of the series numerator 
property but is not explained by this latter property.
What is different about mini-project (9) is that the mathematical stakes are 
higher. Taking (9) to be a genuine target of explanation forces the introduction 
of hyperbolic functions. This expands the domain of mathematical ontology at 
Non-Optional Projects
Page 15 of 16
PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (oxford.universitypressscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 
2020. All Rights Reserved. An individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use.  
Subscriber: Swarthmore College; date: 12 August 2020
least from the natural numbers to the real numbers, since the function sinhx is 
given by (p.235)
and perhaps to the imaginary numbers also, since complex analysis provides the 
most natural setting for hyperbolic functions such as sinh.
12.7 Conclusions
In this chapter, I have focused on Enoch’s proposed indispensability-based 
criterion for ontological commitment,
(IP) We ought rationally to be ontologically committed to F’s if F’s are 
instrumentally indispensable for an intrinsically indispensable project.
I have focused in particular on his notion of ‘project’ and what it might be for 
such projects to be ‘intrinsically indispensable’. My main contention has been 
that the issue plays out very differently in the context of the two major domains 
that Enoch considers, namely applied mathematics and metaethics. Central to 
this difference is that metanormative truths permeate the deliberative project in 
a way that mathematical truths do not permeate the explanatory subproject of 
science. Once this is coupled with the general abandonment of strong holism 
assumptions in the philosophy of science, this shifts the debate to focus on 
individual ‘mini-projects’ rather than the global project that Enoch considers. 
For such mini-projects, a different notion of rational non-optionality is needed to 
ground their intrinsic indispensability. I argue that the notion of a salient 
mathematical property can do this job in the context of mini-projects that seek to 
explain why some physical phenomenon has a given mathematical property. 
Whether some corresponding notion of a salient metanormative property can do 
useful work in grounding a metaethical indispensability argument is a question 
that I leave to be addressed on another occasion.
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Notes:
(1) In what follows, I will mostly revert to the original formulations, (1) and (4), 
and not worry about paraphrasing the X-relatum along the lines of (1’) and (4’).
(2) In this connection, it is interesting to note that in specifying the project 
associated with mathematical indispensability arguments, Enoch sometimes 
describes it in activity terms (as ‘the explanatory project’) and sometimes in 
subject-matter terms (as ‘the scientific project’).
(3) See e.g. Baker (2005, 2009).
(4) A definitive defense of this claim is hampered by the fact that Enoch does not 
say much more about what it is to be ‘rationally non-optional’ (as Enoch himself 
acknowledges in a humorous footnote (2011 p. 71, n. 51)).
(5) Compare Hume-style assertions about the psychological inevitability of 
inductive reasoning. Even if this is true in general, we do seem capable of 
resisting specific cases of inductive inference.
(6) Compare also Enoch’s remark: ‘[I]t’s not clear that this line of thought can be 
applied to deliberation as a whole (rather than to some particular tokens of 
deliberation).’ (2011 p. 77)
(7) For example, if the explanandum is that completing an Euler tour of some 
very complicated network is impossible. Perhaps it is possible after all!
(8) For example, if the explanandum is that the Mona Lisa is considered to be 
such a valuable work of art.
(9) For discussion of this issue in connection with mathematical explanation in 
science, see Baker (2012).
(10) Enoch discusses this issue (2011 pp. 61–3), and argues that having a low 
chance of success is good grounds for taking a given project to be optional.
(11) Another, even simpler, example: why do human beings have a prime number 
of legs?
(12) This series appears as sequence A069853 in the Sloane Online Encyclopedia 
of Integer Sequences.
